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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In her verified amended petition for post-conviction relief, Majid Kolestani aka
Nastaran Kolestani asserted she pleaded guilty in the underlying criminal case after her trial
counsel told her that, if she did not plead guilty, she would be immediately deported to a country
where she would be executed for being a transgender woman. Thus, Ms. Kolestani asserted she
did not enter into the plea agreement knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently, because her guilty
plea had been coerced. She also asserted that her trial counsel gave her deeply erroneous advice
on deportation law. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary disposition with
respect to the above claims.
Ms. Kolestani subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting the district
court reconsider the erroneous advice claim in light of a report from an immigration attorney that
she faced the real possibility of remaining in detention indefinitely. Ms. Kolestani asserted she
was never told about that possibility, and trial counsel’s legal advice on immigration
consequences was therefore erroneous. The district court denied the motion without comment.
Ms. Kolestani appealed, asserting the district court erred when it summarily dismissed
her coerced guilty plea and erroneous advice claims, and the district court abused its discretion
when it denied the motion for reconsideration without comment.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Ms. Kolestani has not shown the district court
erred in summarily dismissing her involuntary guilty plea and erroneous deportation advice
claims, and she has not shown any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying her
motion for reconsideration. (See Resp. Br., pp.6-27.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address
the State’s arguments.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Kolestani’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Ms. Kolestani’s coerced guilty plea
claim, because she raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether her plea was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary?

II.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Ms. Kolestani’s erroneous advice
claim, because she raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether trial counsel gave
her deeply erroneous advice on deportation consequences?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Kolestani’s motion for
reconsideration without comment, because the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards or reach its decision by an exercise of reason?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Ms. Kolestani’s Coerced Guilty Plea Claim,
Because She Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On Whether Her Plea Was Not Knowing,
Intelligent, And Voluntary
A.

Introduction
Ms. Kolestani asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing her coerced guilty

plea claim, because she raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether her plea was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

The district court determined the record disproved

Ms. Kolestani’s claim, and she entered her plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
(R., p.308.) However, Ms. Kolestani actually presented a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether her plea was involuntary because it was coerced through ignorance or fear.

See

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593-594
(Ct. App. 1993).

B.

Ms. Kolestani Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Her Guilty
Plea Was Involuntary Because It Was Coerced Through Ignorance Or Fear
Ms. Kolestani asserts she presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her

guilty plea was involuntary because it was coerced through ignorance or fear. She raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether her guilty plea was improperly obtained through
ignorance, because she asserted that, based on her trial counsel’s erroneous advice, she believed
that unless she signed the plea agreement, she would be immediately deported from the United
States. (See R., pp.142, 145.) Ms. Kolestani also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether her guilty plea was improperly obtained through fear, because she believed that if she
were deported to Afghanistan or Pakistan, she would be immediately executed. (See R., p.143.)
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Accepting Ms. Kolestani’s assertions as true, an innocent person would have felt compelled to
plead guilty in like circumstances. See Mata, 124 Idaho at 594. Ms. Kolestani therefore raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether her guilty plea was coerced by being improperly
obtained through ignorance or fear.
The State argues, “[a]s found by the district court . . . [Ms.] Kolestani’s allegations did
not present a prima facie claim that her guilty plea was involuntary because her claims of
ignorance and coercion are affirmatively disproved by the underlying criminal record.”
(Resp. Br., p.9.) The State contends that Ms. Kolestani’s “answers to the questions asked of her
on the guilty plea questionnaire, coupled with her representations during the plea colloquy,
directly contradict her post-conviction claims that her plea was involuntary.” (Resp. Br., p.11.)
While acknowledging the plea agreement was silent on deportation consequences, and the trial
court never asked Ms. Kolestani about her understanding of what would happen if she did not
plead guilty, the State argues those facts are irrelevant. (See Resp. Br., p.12.) According to the
State, “other portions of the underlying criminal record, including the guilty plea advisory form
and the transcript of the plea colloquy, show [Ms.] Kolestani was aware she could be deported if
she pled guilty,” and she also “expressly disavowed having been ‘pressured’ or ‘threatened’ or
‘coerced’ ‘in any way’ to enter her plea and claimed to have disclosed all matters that affected
her decision to plead guilty.” (Resp. Br., p.12 (emphasis in original).)
Ms. Kolestani’s awareness that she could be deported, based on the trial court’s queries
and her responses during the plea colloquy, was an awareness that she could be deported after
she pleaded guilty and served her sentence. (See R., p.264.) Further, Ms. Kolestani answered in
the negative when the district court asked during the plea colloquy whether “anyone pressured
you or threatened you or coerced you in any way to enter this guilty plea today.” (See R., p.266.)
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However, the advisory form and trial court did not ask Ms. Kolestani whether she was aware of
the deportation consequences if she did not plead guilty. (See R., pp.254, 264.) Put otherwise,
they did not disabuse Ms. Kolestani of her understanding that she would be immediately
deported if she failed to plead guilty. (See R., pp.142-43.) Thus, Ms. Kolestani’s assertions
were not affirmatively disproven by the record from the underlying criminal case. Despite the
State’s arguments, Ms. Kolestani raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her guilty
plea was coerced by being improperly obtained through ignorance or fear. See Mata, 124 Idaho
at 593-594.

II.
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Ms. Kolestani’s Erroneous Advice Claim,
Because She Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On Whether Trial Counsel Gave Her
Deeply Erroneous Advice On Deportation Consequences

A.

Introduction
Ms. Kolestani asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing her erroneous

advice claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because she raised a genuine issue of material
fact on whether trial counsel gave her deeply erroneous advice on deportation consequences.
The district court determined the record disproved Ms. Kolestani’s assertion that trial counsel
was deficient, and her claim was not supported by the record or the district court’s inferences.
(R., pp.311-12.)

However, Ms. Kolestani presented a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether trial counsel’s representation, namely the erroneous advice that Ms. Kolestani would be
immediately deported if she did not plead guilty, was deficient because it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010); Aragon v. State,
114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). Further, Ms. Kolestani will be able to demonstrate there is a genuine
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issue of material fact as to whether she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance.
See Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho 234, 235 (Ct. App. 2015).

B.

Ms. Kolestani Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Trial
Counsel’s Representation Was Deficient, Because Trial Counsel’s Erroneous Advice On
Deportation Consequences Fell Below An Objective Standard Of Reasonableness
Ms. Kolestani asserts she presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial

counsel’s representation was deficient. Construing the facts in Ms. Kolestani’s favor, trial
counsel’s erroneous advice that Ms. Kolestani would be immediately deported if she did not
plead guilty was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Ms. Kolestani sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency by trial counsel, through trial
counsel’s erroneous advice on deportation consequences, to satisfy the first prong of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. The district court
erred when it determined trial counsel’s representation was not deficient; the district court’s
inference that Ms. Kolestani would have brought trial counsel’s deeply erroneous advice to the
attention of the trial court was inappropriate under the applicable standard, because the district
court drew that inference from facts in dispute. See Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530 (2015).
The State argues, “although the district court was not permitted at the summary dismissal
stage of the proceedings to weigh conflicting evidence, it was also not required to accept as true
any allegations in [Ms.] Kolestani’s post-conviction petition that were affirmatively disproved by
the record of the underlying criminal case.”

(Resp. Br., p.17.)

The State also contends,

“contrary to [Ms.] Kolestani’s assertions, there was no conflicting evidence for the court to
weigh.” (Resp. Br., p.17.)
The State argues that it disputed the allegation that trial counsel gave the above erroneous
advice, but not through submitting “any conflicting evidence. Instead, the State argued the
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allegations in the petition were conclusory and disproved by the underlying criminal record.”
(See Resp. Br., pp.17-18.) The State argues the district court ultimately agreed with the latter
proposition. (Resp. Br., p.18.) Further, according to the State, Ms. Kolestani’s statements
during the guilty plea proceedings supported the district court’s inference that Ms. Kolestani
would have informed the district court during those proceedings of the erroneous advice, had it
been given, and her statements affirmatively disproved the erroneous advice claim.

(See

Resp. Br., p.18.)
The State essentially argues that for evidentiary facts to be disputed, both parties must
submit conflicting evidence. (See Resp. Br., p.18.) However, that is not the standard. As
discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., p.24), the Idaho Supreme Court in Adams held that
“[w]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences
because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.”
Adams, 158 Idaho at 536 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Adams
Court also held “the trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing a summary judgment motion. Instead, the trial judge is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.” Id. (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Adams Court did not require a party to submit

conflicting evidence to dispute an evidentiary fact.
Here, the State disputed whether trial counsel had ever advised Ms. Kolestani she would
be immediately deported if she did not plead guilty. (See R., pp.185, 242; Tr. 04/10/17 p.7,
Ls.11-18, p.9, Ls.4-11.)

Because the State disputed whether trial counsel had advised

Ms. Kolestani she would be immediately deported if she did not plead guilty, it was
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inappropriate for the district court to make its inference. Under the standard from Adams, the
district court did not have “uncontroverted evidentiary facts” from which to draw its inference
based on trial counsel’s erroneous advice. See Adams, 158 Idaho at 536. Instead, the district
court should have “liberally construe[d] the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. In sum, the record did not affirmatively
disprove Ms. Kolestani’s erroneous advice claim, and the district court erred when it determined
trial counsel’s representation was not deficient.

C.

Ms. Kolestani Will Be Able To Demonstrate There Is A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
As To Whether She Was Prejudiced By Trial Counsel’s Deficient Performance
Ms. Kolestani asserts that, on remand, she will be able to demonstrate there is a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said it would be irrational for someone in
Ms. Kolestani’s position to reject the plea. See Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1969
(2017). There is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s error, she would not have
pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Keserovic, 158 Idaho at 235.
With respect to the prejudice prong, the State argues, “[b]ecause the underlying criminal
record affirmatively disproves the allegation that trial counsel advised [Ms.] Kolestani she would
be immediately deported if she did not plead guilty, [Ms.] Kolestani’s petition necessarily failed
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of her
erroneous deportation advice claim.” (Resp. Br., p.18.) As shown above, the record did not
affirmatively disprove the allegation that trial counsel gave Ms. Kolestani erroneous advice.
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Ms. Kolestani will be able to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. 1

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Kolestani’s Motion for
Reconsideration Without Comment, Because The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With
The Applicable Legal Standards Or Reach Its Decision By An Exercise Of Reason

A.

Introduction
Ms. Kolestani asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for

reconsideration without comment, because the district court did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards or reach its decision by an exercise of reason.

The motion for

reconsideration is an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. The district court denied the
motion for reconsideration without explaining why Ms. Kolestani’s case did not meet the
circumstances of Rule 60(b). (See R., p.433.) Thus, the district court’s silence was an abuse
of discretion.

1

The State writes that the district court declined to summarily dismiss Ms. Kolestani’s petition
for being untimely, because the district court found “the allegations in the petition raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Ms.] Kolestani was entitled to equitable tolling.”
(Resp. Br., p.19.) The State notes, “because the court ultimately dismissed the claims in the
petition on their merits, the court never conducted an evidentiary hearing on the statute of
limitations issue.” (Resp. Br., p.19.) The State argues that, in the event the Court “finds
[Ms.] Kolestani presented a genuine issue of material fact as to one or both of those claims [on
appeal], the state submits the proper remedy is remand to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing on the statute of limitations issue, as well as on the substantive claim(s).” (Resp. Br.,
p.19 (citing Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 665 (1979).)
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B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied The Motion For
Reconsideration Without Comment
Ms. Kolestani asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for

reconsideration without comment. The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[w]hen a district court
fails to explain why a case does not meet I.R.C.P. 60(b)’s circumstances, the court abuses its
discretion.” Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 914 (2014) (citing Printcraft Press,
Inc., v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 450 (2012)).
The State argues, “[a]ssuming, without conceding, that the district court should have
treated the motion as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, any error arising from its failure to do so or to
explain its reasons for denying the motion is harmless because the allegations in the motion are
insufficient, as a matter of law, to entitle [Ms.] Kolestani to relief under the rule.”
(Resp. Br., p.20 (footnote omitted).) In other words, the State basically contends that, even
though the district court did not explain its denial of the motion for reconsideration, any such
abuse of discretion was harmless because the motion was without merit. (See Resp. Br., pp.2527.) However, the district court’s abuse of discretion was not harmless, because the motion for
reconsideration was actually meritorious.
The State argues that, while post-conviction counsel explained to the district court at the
status conference that he erroneously believed the immigration report was part of the court file at
the time the district court entered its summary dismissal order, “[c]ounsel did not make any
similar representations in the motion to reconsider . . . and thus failed in the motion to allege,
much less demonstrate, that his failure to timely submit the immigration report was the result of
excusable neglect.”

(See Resp. Br., p.23.)

However, “[i]n determining whether a party’s

conduct constitutes excusable neglect, the courts must consider each case in light of its unique
facts.” Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 527 (Ct. App. 1988). Further, in a case where a
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district court’s grant of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion was on appeal, but the district court did not
specify on what ground it had granted the motion and made no written findings, the Idaho Court
of Appeals stated, “[o]ur decision rests on the record as it exists before us.” See Washington
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 915-17 (Ct. App.
1993).2 Thus, this Court may consider post-conviction counsel’s representations at the status
conference, part of the “unique facts” of this case, when deciding whether counsel’s conduct
constituted excusable neglect.
The State also contends Ms. Kolestani has not shown any excusable neglect, because
“[p]ost-conviction counsel’s conduct in merely assuming the immigration report ‘had become
part of the court file’ before the court ruled on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, when it
was [Ms.] Kolestani’s burden to present admissible evidence supporting her post-conviction
claims, was not that of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.” (See
Resp. Br., pp.23-24.) But post-conviction counsel had explained that he thought the immigration
report had become part of the court file, and only later realized the report had been sent just to
Ms. Kolestani and the State. (See Tr. 09/11/17, p.4, Ls.11-15.) A reasonably prudent person
under the same circumstances might have made the same assumption.
Further, the State argues that even if Ms. Kolestani could show excusable neglect, the
allegations in the motion for reconsideration were insufficient for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)
because she had not shown, pleaded or presented evidence of facts which, if established, would
constitute a meritorious defense to the action. (See Resp. Br., p.24 (quoting Ponderosa Paint
Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317 (Ct. App. 1994).) The State is correct in stating that “[i]t

2

Undersigned counsel inadvertently cited Washington Federal in the Appellant’s Brief as if it
were an Idaho Supreme Court case (see App. Br., p.32), and apologizes for the mistake.
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is incumbent upon a party seeking relief from a judgment not only to meet the requirements of
I.R.C.P. 60(b), but also to show, plead or present evidence of facts which, if established, would
constitute a meritorious defense to the action.” See Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 726
(2011) (quoting Ponderosa Paint, 125 Idaho at 317).

The party seeking relief must also

demonstrate unique and compelling circumstances which justify relief. Id.
The State argues, “[b]ecause [Ms.] Kolestani never alleged in her post-conviction petition
that her trial counsel was ineffective for giving her any immigration advice, the claim in her
motion for reconsideration that the immigration report showed counsel’s unspecified advice was
‘wrong’ was not a claim that, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the court’s
order dismissing [Ms.] Kolestani’s post-conviction claims.” (See Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) The
State contends the denial of the motion for reconsideration should be affirmed on that basis. (See
Resp. Br., p.25.)
However, while the erroneous advice claim in Ms. Kolestani’s petition centered on the
allegation that trial counsel advised Ms. Kolestani that she would be immediately deported if she
did not plead guilty, it also contained more general language on trial counsel’s erroneous advice
on deportation consequences.

(See R., pp.144-45.)

For example, the petition declared:

“Petitioner first states that counsel was deeply erroneous in deportation law.” (R., p.144.) The
petition also asserted, “counsel did not give correct advice as required by Padilla.” (R., p.145.)
Additionally, the petition asserted, “[i]t was not reasonable for counsel to give immigration
advice to Petitioner that was not actually correct.” (R., p.145.)
The motion for reconsideration asserted, based on the immigration report, that
Ms. Kolestani faced the real possibility of being detained indefinitely after her sentence, and trial
counsel never disclosed that to her. (See R., p.384.) Thus, the motion for reconsideration
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asserted trial counsel had provided bad advice. (See R., p.384.) Ms. Kolestani therefore submits
that, to the extent her petition asserted trial counsel was ineffective because her advice on
deportation consequences in general was erroneous, the motion for reconsideration presented
evidence of facts (namely, from the immigration report), which, if established, would constitute a
meritorious defense to the summary dismissal of the erroneous advice claim. See Maynard, 152
Idaho at 726. Considering the severe consequence of indefinite detention, and trial counsel’s
failure to discuss that possibility with Ms. Kolestani, this case also displays the requisite “unique
and compelling circumstances” which justify relief under Rule 60(b). See id. The motion for
reconsideration was meritorious.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Kolestani’s motion for
reconsideration without comment, because the district court did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards or reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Ms. Kolestani has
shown the district court’s abuse of discretion was not harmless, because the motion for
reconsideration was meritorious.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Kolestani respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s summary
disposition order as to her coerced guilty plea claim, and remand the matter to the district court
for an evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Kolestani also respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
summary disposition order as to her erroneous advice ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and
remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, or alternatively remand the
matter to the district court for further proceedings to determine if Ms. Kolestani raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced her case.
Further, Ms. Kolestani respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order denying the motion for reconsideration, and remand the matter to the district court for
further proceedings on the motion.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of September, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BPM/eas
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